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tioner would not have been prejudiced by failing to gain appellate
review of the 1936 trial.
The court in-the principal case considered the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Dowd v. United States cx rel. Cook 3l to be
controlling. The Cook case held that action by Indiana State Prison
officials similar to that in the principal case which had resulted in the
obstruction of a prisoner's attempt to gain appellate review constitut-
ed a denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Since the United States Supreme Court mandate in the Cook
case said that the defect could only be cured by full appellate re-
view,32 this court reasoned by analogy that the petitioner's motion for
a new trial was filed only to perfect his right to appellate review33 and
that only such review would cure the original defect.
, In the Cook case, prison officials thwarted the prisoner's attempt to
file the requisite appeal papers following a refusal of his motion for a
new trial. The language of the mandate was that since the prisoner
had been denied his statutory right to file the appeal papers the only
cure for this denial of equal protection was full appellate review.
Hence, the analogy that the Pierce court drew from the Cook mandate
would appear erroneous. A correct analogy would be that since the
petitioner had been denied the right to file a motion for a new trial
the only cure would be to allow him to file the motion. Since he was
allowed to file the motion in 1949, it is submitted that the defect of
denial of equal protection was cured when the motion was granted.
By following this court's literal interpretation of the Cook man-
date; the court which granted the motion for a new trial should have
denied the motion so that the petitioner could prosecute an appeal.
It is anomalous to say that a court has erred by failing to make an er-
roneous ruling.
JOSEPH M. SPIVEY, III
FEDERAL DIVERSITY SUITS BY AMERICAN CITIZENS
DOMICILED ABROAD
A citizen of the United States domiciled outside the United States
cannot bring an action in a federal court under the diversity of citizen-
3134o U.S. 206 (1951).
wId. at 209.
33"Subsequent to the Walker decision, commencing January 3, 1949, the
petitioner ... filed various pleadings intended to-perfect the record for the purposes
of an appeal and not for the 'purpose of having their Belated Motion for New
Trial granted....1" 93 F. Supp. at 398.
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ship jurisdiction. This rule was recently applied in Pemberton v.
Colonna,' decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
plaintiff had resided in Pennsylvania from 1927 to 195o at which
time she, with her husband, had moved to Mexico, where they lived
under tourist cards. Upon the death of her husband, the plaintiff
chose to remain in Mexico but maintained her business and voting
connections in Pennsylvania. In 1959 the plaintiff commenced suit
against the defendant, a citizen of Pennsylvania, in the Federal District
Court for that state. The district court found that no diversity of
citizenship was alleged and refused jurisdiction. 2 On appeal the Court
of Appeals held that since the plaintiff was domiciled in Mexico, 3 she
had no standing to bring a diversity action, as she was not a citizen
of a different state than that of the defendant. The court relied on
Title 28, section 1332(a)(i) of the United States Code which provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $io,ooo, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(i) citizens of different states ... "4
The court upheld the district court's finding that the plaintiff was
not a citizen of any state of the United States but was an American
citizen without state citizenship. 5 The court further said that as the
plaintiff lived in Mexico only as a domiciliary, she could not maintain
a diversity action as a citizen of a foreign state under section 1332(a)(2),
which provides:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter... is between-
(2) citizens of a state, and foreign states or citizens or sub-
jects thereof... ."6
The result of this decision is to preclude American citizens domi-
ciled abroad from instituting diversity actions in the federal courts.
The matter is made worse by the fact that under this view aliens have
greater rights of access to American federal courts than United States
citizens domiciled abroad. This hardly seems proper under a rational
constitutional scheme.
The diversity of citizenship jurisdiction will be analyzed from
the historical standpoint in order to clarify the reasons behind the
29o F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1961).
TPemberton v. Colonna, 189 F. Supp. 43o (E.D. Pa. ;96o).
329o F.2d at 221. See also 189 F.Supp. at 4.31.
'72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1958).
129o F.2d at 221.
672 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1958).
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Pemberton decision and an effort will be made to propose a satisfac-
tory solution to the problem. The diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
is, of course, found in the Constitution.7 The Constitution provides
for a "supreme Court,"$ but it is the only federal judicial forum re-
quired by the document. Congress is given the power to establish
inferior federal courts as it may see fitY The scope of the diversity jur-
isdiction was first defined in the Judiciary Act of 178910 and has re-
mained relatively limited even to the present day, because of the sta-
tutory jurisdictional amount limitation." Section ii of the Act of
1789 repeats the substance of the language of the Constitution adding
a jurisdictional amount 2 and placing this jurisdiction in the circuit
courts, then the federal trial courts.' 3 The first act did not define the
word citizen so this determination devolved to the courts. The Consti-
tution gives Congress the power to enact "an uniform Rule of Natural-
ization."14 However, the First Congress in its first session did not ex-
ercise the power. The first naturalization act defining United States
citizenship was not enacted until March 26, 1790,1 nearly two months
after the Supreme Court had first convened on February 2, 179011
Originally, then, the only source for a definition of citizenship was to
be found in state law. All states in one form or another 7 had separate
-U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
"U.S. Const. art. III, § i.
"Ibid. and art. I, § 8.
lot Stat. 73.
"See i Stat. 78 (jurisdictional amount $5oo), and 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S. C. § 1332(a)
(1958) (jurisdictional amount now $io,ooo).
2 l Stat. 78.
"3Ibid.
"U.S. Const. art. l § 8, c. 4.
'31 Stat. 1o3. This provision remained in the naturalization acts for twelve years,
see t Stat. 415, 2 Stat. 155.
"6The Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United Statcs 1789-1806, 5 Am. J.
Leg. Hist. 67, 69 (1961).
I'Zephaniah Swift gives the following description at the naturalization laws of
Connecticut:
"Our law considers persons residing here in a threefold light; foreign-
ers who are born in some foreign dominion: those who are inhabitants of
some other state of the union: and those who are inhabitants of this state.
"No foreigners can gain a legal settlement in any town in this state,
unless he be admitted by a major vote of the inhabitants of such town, or
by the consent of the civil authority and selectmen, or shall be appointed
to, and execute some public office. In any of these ways our law authorizes
foreigners to obtain legal settlements.
"No person who is an inhabitant of one of the other of the United
States, can gain a legal settlement in any town in this state, unless he be ad-
mitted by the major vote of the inhabitants, or by the consent of the civil
1962] CASE COMMENTS 8l
naturalization procedures, varying from general enabling acts l 5 to
special acts of the legislature.19 Virginia had one of the more compre-
hensive general acts. An Act of 1786 sets forth the persons deemed to
be citizens of the commonwealth and the steps necessary to become
naturalized citizens of the state in the following manner:
"That all free persons, born within the territory of this com-
nionwealth, all persons, not being natives, who have obtained
a right to citizenship under the act, intitled "An act declaring
who shall be deemed citizens of this commonwealth;" and also
all children wheresoever born, whose fathers or mothers are,
or were, citizens at the time of the birth of such children, shall
be deemed citizens of this commonwealth, until -they relinquish
that character, in manner herein after-mentioned; and that all
persons, other than alien enemies, who shall migrate into this
state, and shall before some court of record, give satisfactory
authority and selectmen, or be appointed to and execute some public office,
or unless he shall be possessed in his own right in fee, or a real estate to the
value of one hundred pounds during his continuance therein. No time of
residence shall gain a legal settlement.
"An inhabitant of one town may gain a legal settlement in another, by
vote of the inhabitants, by consent of the civil authority and selectmen, by
being appointed and executing some public office, or acquiring in his own
right in fee, a real estate to the value of thirty pounds." i Swift, A System
of Laws of the State of Connecticut, 167-68 (1795)-
I Five states had general naturalization acts during all or part of the period.
See Watkins, Digest of Ga. Laws 1732-18oo, 430, 522, 538 (i8oo); i Kilty, Laws of Md.
ch. 6, 1779; Dallas, Laws of Pa., 676-78 (1793); 4 S.C. Stat. 6oo (act of 1784); f2
Hening, Va. Stat, at L. 261 (act of 1786). The Virginia statute, quoted in the text, is
typical except for the provision for voluntary expatriation from state citizenship
which is not found in any of the other state laws of this period.
"'Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island
naturalized persons by special legislative acts in individual cases. i Crosskey, Politics
and the Constitution, 487, note 37 (1953), contains a compilation of citations to these
special acts. North Carolina used the more informal practice of legislative resolu-
tion. Id. at 187, note 38. Delaware does not appear to have had either general or
special acts during this time. Id. at 488.
In certain cases the Virginia general assembly would confer citizenship in the
commonwealth oin a person by special act. The following is an example: "An act for
the naturalization of the Marquis De La Fayette.
"I. WHEREAS the Marquis De La Fayette is eminently distinguished,
by early and signal exertions in defense of American liberty: And whereas
this illustrious nobleman continues to afford testimonies of unceasing af-
fection to this state, and the general assembly being solicitous to bestow the
most decisive mark of regard which a republic can give:
"II. Be it enacted, That the Marquis De La Fayette be henceforth
deemed and considered a citizen of this state, and that he shall enjoy all the
rights, privileges, and immunities, thereunto belonging." 12 Hening, Va.
Slat. at L. 30 (act of 1785). Query, since La Fayette did not renounce his
French citizenship, what would be his status in a federal court during the
period in which there was no federal naturalization act?
82 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
proof by oath (or being quakers or menonites, by affirmation)
that they intend to reside therein, and also take the legal oath
or affirmation, for giving assurance of fidelity to the common-
wealth (which oaths or affirmations the clerk of court shall en-
ter on record ... "20
One of the more unusual sections of this statute was a proviso for
expatriation from citizenship in the commonwealth:
"That whensoever any citizen of this commonwealth shall, by
deed in writing, under his hand and seal, executed in the pres-
ence of and subscribed by three witnesses, and by them, proved
in the general court or the court wherein he resides, or by
open verbal declaration made in either of said courts, to be by
them entered of record, declare that he relinquishes the charac-
ter of a citizen, and shall depart out of this commonwealth, such
person shall, from the time of his departure, be considered as
having exercised his right of expatriation, and shall thenceforth
be deemed no citizen."
2' 1
If Congress had never adopted a uniform rule, such statutes of natural-
ization would have been the only method to determine citizenship for
purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in federal courts.
In 179o the first federal naturalization act was passed by Congress,
22
which spelled out necessary procedures to be followed to become a
citizen of the United States, and added the following proviso:
"That no person heretofore proscribed by any State, shall be
admitted a citizen as aforesaid, except by an act of the legisla-
ture of the state in which such person was proscribed."
25
Collett v. Collett24 was the first case 25 to present the question of
whait constitutes state citizenship for diversity of citizenship purposes.
It was decided in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in
1792. The case was tried on the equity side of the court, the com-
plainant alleging he was a British subject and that the respondent
'12 Hening, Va. Stat. at L. 261-62. The 1786 act also contained a proscription
clause designed to prevent the migration to or the granting of citizenship to cer-
tain "undesirable" elements. Id. at 263.
2112 Hening, Va. Stat. at L. 263. To the effect that a person could not ex-
patriate himself without his government's consent, see Williams' case, 29 Fed. Cas.
1331 (No. 17708) (C.C.D. Conn. 1799).
21 Stat. 103.
-3Id. at 1O4.
2'2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792).
' As an historical note, the Collett case was not only the first case on this sub-
ject, but it was also the first case on the appellate docket of the Supreme Court. The
case is not reported in the Supreme Court reports as it was removed from the
docket by counsel. See National Archives, Microcopy No. 214, Roll i; Case Papers
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Case i.
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was a citizen of Pennsylvania. The respondent filed a plea to the juris-
diction contending the complainant was a naturalized citizen of Penn-
sylvania. The plea was upheld and the court dismissed the action
intimating that it felt state naturalization was sufficient to constitute
both federal and state citizenship. Therefore, the complainant, being
a citizen of Pennsylvania, could not bring a diversity action.2 6 The
court in regard to the power of the states to naturalize persons as op-
posed to the federal power stated:
"The true reason for investing Congress with power of naturali-
zation has been assigned at the Bar: -It was to guard against
too narrow, instead of too liberal, a mode of conferring the
rights of citizenship." 27
The first appearance of the concept of domicile as a determinative
of citizenship is found in argument in the second case of Bingham v.
Cabot.28 Dexter in this argument declares that:
".. . on the principle of the constitution, a citizen of the United
States, is to be .considered ... a citizen of that state, in which
he has his house and family, is a permanent inhabitant, and is,
in short, domiciliated....-29
Although the argument did not prevail at this time, it was utilized
by Chief Justice Marshall on circuit in Prentiss v. Barton.30 Marshall
first stated:
"Accordingly the universal understanding and practice of Am-
erica is, that a citizen of the United States residing perman-
ently in any state, is a citizen of that state."3'
In deciding that domicile was the proper test, he continued:
"In the sense of the constitution and of the judicial act, he who
is incorporated with the body of the state, by permanent resi-
dence therein, so as to become a member of it, must be a citizen
of that state, although born in another. Or, to use the phrase
more familiar in the books, a citizen of the United States must
be a citi7en of that state, in which his domicile is placed."
32
-0- U.S. (- Dali.) at 296.
-Ibid. See note 23 supra. The proscription clause in the first naturalization
act substantiates this reasoning.
3 U.S. (3 DaIl.) 382 (1798). This case appeared before the Supreme Court in
1795, and was reversed without the problem of jurisdiction being considered. 3 U.S.
(3 Dail.) 19 (1795). On the second appeal this case "and many others in the same
predicament were, accordingly, struck off the docket" for defective allegations of
diversity of citizenship. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 382, 383 (1798).
-3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 383.
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Marshall thus relied on the domicile of the party as the controlling
factor in making his determination of diversity of citizenship in this
case.33
The first case to appear on facts analogous to -those in the Pen?-
berton case was Prentiss v. Brennan"3 4 decided in 1851 in the Circuit
Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff, who had
lived in Canada for many years, alleged that he was a citizen of New
York and that the defendant was a British subject. The defendant
pleaded that the plaintiff had taken an oath of allegiance to the sov-
ereign of Great Britain. This plea was upheld, but the court in dictum
added that the plaintiff's:
"[R]esidence and domicil are in the province of Canada, and
not in this state; and hence, though for some purposes he may
still be regarded as a citizen of the United States, he is not a
citizen of the state of New-York which is essential to give jur-
isdiction....
"A person may be a citizen of the United States, and not a
citizen of any particular state. This is the condition of citizens
residing in the District of Columbia, and in the territories of
the United States, or who have taken up a residence abroad,
and others that might be mentioned."
' ' -
In light of ,the facts of the case it would seem the court would have
been correct in deciding the case on the ground that two aliens may
not maintain a diversity action in a federal court."0 From the fore-
going it appears that the meaning of the diversity of citizenship juris-
diction in 1789 was not understood in the later times. It appeared that
in 1789 a person was either a citizen of a state of the United States or
he would not be a citizen. The effect of a singular federal citizenship as
the first hurdle of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was not con-
templated at that time. The later cases exhibit a misunderstanding
of the historical concept which has led to the Pemberton dilemma.
3 7
The rationale by which an American citizen domiciled abroad can
begiven access to the federal courts is that for diversity purposes state
citizenship, as deteimined by a person's domicile, is not lost until
=Ibid.
3t.9 Fed. Cas. 1278 (No. 11385) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851).
Id. at 1279.
StMontalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 46 (1807); Mossman v. Higginson,
,j U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (18oo).
3'See Wittmeyer Trucking Co. v. Fess Transp. Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 802 (W.D.
N.Y. 1961); McClanahan v. Galloway, 127 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Hammer-
stein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165 (W.D. Mo. 1912). Cf. Pannill v. Roanoke Times Co., 252
Fed. 91O (W.D. Va. i9i8). See also Baker v. Keck, 13 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Ill. 1936):
Cooper v. Galbraith, 6 Fed. Cas. 472 (No. 3193) (C.C.D. Pa. 18ig).
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either: citizenship in another state is acquired, or until American
citizenship is abandoned. An analogy for this approach is to be found
in the English cases applying the renvoi, a conflict of laws doctrine well
established in England."" The case of In re O'Keefe'9 illustrates the
point. A woman of British nationality died domiciled in Italy leaving
personal property in England. Under what law should her English
personal estate be administered? The English court applied the renvoi
doctrine to distribute the estate. The English conflict of laws rule is
that personal property or movables, in conflict of laws terminology,
are distributed by the whole law of the domicile of the decedent at
the time of death. The court held that under English law the decedent
was domiciled in Italy. Therefore, the court looked to the Italian law,
including its conflict of laws rules. It found that under Italian law
movables are distributed by the internal law of nationality, since Italy
does not follow the renvoi doctrine. Consequently an Italian court
would distribute the decedent's personal property in Italy by the law
of her nationality which was British. But there is no British law of
descents and distributions, the constituent parts of the British Empire
or Commonwealth each having its own individual laws of descents and
distributions. This is the same as in the United States where the states
have such laws, there being no nationwide law on the subject. Thus
it was necessary to connect this deceased British national to some
political subdivision of the British Empire. To do this, the court
looked for the place she was last domiciled in the empire before chang-
ing her domicile to Italy.4 0 The court went back over one hundred
years to place the decedent's domicile in Ireland. Her father had been
domiciled in Ireland, so that was her domicile of origin. This Irish
domicile of origin had not been changed until she acquired a domicile
of choice in Italy.
If this approach were used, every American citizen would have a
state citizenship for diversity of citizenship purposes.41 The preferable
sln re Annesley, [1926] ch. 692. See also In re Askew, [1930] 2 Ch. 259.
'0[1940 ] Ch. 121
.
10The decedent was born in India in 1863; her father was born in Ireland in
1835. During her life, the decedent had been to Ireland but once for a short time,
and had lived at various places in England, France and Spain until 189o, when
she moved to ItalN, living there until she died, intestate and unmarried, in 1937.
[19o ] Ch. 125-26.
"It would not be necessary to attribute this citizenship to the person for other
purposes such as taxation, divorce, etc., any more than is done by the English
courts. This is brought out in the O'Keefe case as the country of the decedent's
domicile of origin no longer existed-it had become the independent state of
Eire-and the law in that country was such that she was not considered a citizen.
1962]
